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Abstract 
Servitization drives manufacturing firms to develop service offerings characterised by 
increasing levels of complexity. This has also been termed service ladder or transformation 
staircase. Manufacturing companies need to adapt their organisational processes to the 
different stages of the service ladder to provide value to their customers. In particular, this 
paper focuses on contractual and relational capabilities for services of different complexities. 
Based on two case studies within the European Healthcare sector, we found that in a highly 
regulated business context, contractual capabilities only marginally differ depending on 
service complexity. In contrast, the importance of relational capability increases with higher 
levels of service complexity. Developing relational capabilities can function as a competitive 
advantage for manufactures moving into product-service system offerings. 
Keywords:  servitization, service complexity, product-service system, contract and relational 
capabilities, multiple case studies 
1. Introduction 
In order to stay competitive globally, manufacturing companies have increasingly bundled 
their products and services to add value to their core offerings (Spring and Araujo, 2009). 
This change is associated with a shift in focus from individual products or services to the 
provision of product-service systems (PSSs) (Mont, 2000). PSSs are integrated offerings that 
consist of a bundle of products, services and information, seamlessly combined to provide and 
address clients’ needs in order to provide more value than the parts alone (Baines et al., 
2009). Selling and purchasing PSSs confronts organisations with the challenge of developing 
and implementing new PSS strategies and associated organisational structures and 
capabilities. In particular, manufacturers have to develop and implement contractual and 
relational capabilities. 
 
Servitization is connected to increasing levels of service complexity as different service 
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offerings can have different levels of complexity depending on the company’s strategy and 
capabilities (Neely et al., 2011). For instance, offering support services such as maintenance 
incorporates a lower level of service complexity connected to the operational processes and 
delivery system than offering outcome-based contracts such as the delivery of product 
capability. These different levels have been described as a service ladder (Neely et al., 2011) 
or transformation staircase (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2009). However, the 
current literature offers limited insights into the issue of service complexity and relationship 
management in terms of contractual and relational capabilities for PSS providers and 
customers. In particular, the following two issues are still not well understood. First, limited 
research explores a dyadic perspective between service provider and customer as many 
current studies adopt a purely seller perspective. As the value of PSS offerings emerges 
during their use, it is the dyadic relationship that plays a key role in determining the benefit. 
Second, prior studies do mainly not distinguish between different levels of service complexity 
(except Neely et al., 2011) and their impact on contractual and relational capabilities. 
 
We address the above limitations by answering the following two research questions (RQs): 
(i) To what extent do different levels of service complexity impact on contractual capabilities 
when providing and buying PSSs?; (ii) To what extent do different levels of service 
complexity impact on relational capabilities when providing and buying PSSs? We 
investigate the RQs by presenting two case studies of one PSS provider and its customers. 
The studied provider operates in the European healthcare sector and has traditionally been a 
manufacturer of complex engineering products and has made deliberate steps to introduce 
servitization strategies based on PSSs. The presented case studies offered an in-depth 
understanding of contractual and relational capabilities in an organisational context to 
compare the influence of service complexity. Thus, we contribute to the literature in the field 
in two ways. First, the investigation of both PSS provider and customer offers insights into 
the service relationship from a dyadic perspective which helps to draw a more comprehensive 
picture of the PSS and relationship management. Second, we offer a theoretically-grounded 
and empirically-tested framework of service complexity in the context of servitization and its 
influence on contractual and relational capabilities. This will form a guideline for industry to 
strategically plan and develop their service offerings and the necessary contractual and 
relational capabilities. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Service complexity and servitization 
The typical offerings described in the servitization literature are Product Service Systems 
(PSS). PSSs are integrated, seamless combinations of products, services and information 
(Baines et al., 2009). They are often described as integrated solutions (Davies et al., 2006) 
that create value by improving operating efficiency, increasing asset effectiveness, enabling 
market expansion, and mitigating risk (Cornet et al., 2000). The shift towards providing and 
receiving PSSs is typically undertaken gradually (Smith et al., 2012). In other words, 
manufacturing companies provide support services with different degrees of orientation 
around the product. These offerings include different levels of service complexity (Batista et 
al., 2008). Complexity in the context of services can have varying definitions depending on 
their focus (Neely et al., 2011). Reviewing the literature in the field, Benedettini and Neely 
(2011; 2012) found that service complexity can be differentiated into complicatedness and 
difficulty. Complicatedness refers to the high number of components and their interrelation 
within the service provision. Difficulty is defined as the high amount of resources that are 
needed to achieve the intended outcome. In other words, a complicated service offers many 
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different functions while a difficult service delivers sophisticated functions (Benedettini and 
Neely, 2012). However, this does not seem to be a distinct differentiation as a service that 
delivers sophisticated functions often also delivers many different functions. As such, 
complexity can be connected to the engineering system necessary to fulfill the requirements 
(Ng et al., 2011) and the interaction between the service stakeholders (Tien, 2008). 
Complexity can further arise from the dynamic nature of services due to the ‘open’ nature of 
services, i.e. the constant adaptation to context and conditions (Badinelli et al., 2012). 
 
In this paper, we use a definition of complexity associated with the characteristic of the 
services. As such, we do not relate our understanding of service complexity to the amount and 
interaction of the people involved in the production and consumption of a service (Tien, 
2008) or the dynamic change of the service to adapt to new situations and conditions 
(Badinelli et al., 2012). We agree that these are important aspects that can create complexity 
and need to be considered in a coherent understanding of this topic. However, the purpose of 
this paper is to draw the connection between service complexity and contractual and relational 
capabilities and thus we use a more static characterisation of service complexity. This was 
captured in Shostack’s definition which says that complexity is “the number and intricacy of 
the steps required to perform it” (1987: 35). This definition relates to the service system used 
in the literature (Ng et al., 2011) and seems to also incorporate both categories of service 
complexity presented by Benedettini and Neely (2011; 2012). It further highlights the 
activity-centered process of services (Araujo and Spring, 2006). 
 
The assumption is that the path towards offering PSSs is connected to an increasing level of 
service complexity. The shift towards providing and receiving PSSs means that the activities 
and processes of provider and customer become increasingly integrated which has also been 
described as a service ladder (Neely et al., 2011) or transformation staircase (House of 
Commons Defence Committee, 2009). Processes relate to information sharing, planning and 
undertaking of the activities to deliver the availability of a range of products (Tukker, 2004; 
Neely et al., 2011). The higher the level of integration, the more activities and processes are 
necessary to provide and receive the PSS, i.e. the higher the service complexity. This is the 
assumption underlying the research presented in this paper and is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between service complexity and process integration between provider 
and customer of PSS 
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2.2 Capability development for PSS delivery 
The extant body of literature on capabilities has emphasised how organisations must possess 
the relevant resources, knowledge and skills to create or adapt to new market and 
technological opportunities (Teece et al., 1997). A capability is the ability of the organisation 
to perform coordinated activities utilising resources to achieve a goal and to purposefully 
create, extend or modify its resource base (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Zollo and Winter (2002) 
claim that capability development is often initiated by an external stimuli or feedback such as 
a need to transition towards PSS offerings. The heterogeneity of capabilities across 
organisations then is a reflection of different investments of time, efforts and resources in 
these learning activities (Zollo and Winter, 2002). To provide PSS arrangements, 
organisations need to restructure their product-service delivery by establishing new 
contractual and relational capabilities. With regards to relationship management to deliver 
PSS offerings, the following sections review two discrete, yet inter-related, types capabilities: 
contractual and relational.  
2.2.1 Contractual capabilities 
Contractual capabilities refer to the recognition of the contingencies associated with PSS 
offerings and their implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of the service delivery, 
encompassing capabilities to write, negotiate, monitor and enforce contracts (Mayer and 
Argyres, 2004). Contractual safeguards and rules are established to minimise cost and 
performance losses from relationship hazards (Joskow, 1988). In other words, PSS suppliers 
and buyers structure complex contracts to protect themselves from opportunistic behaviour, to 
reduce uncertainties and to specify roles and responsibilities of partnering organisations by 
relying upon legal rules, standards and remedies (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999). The study by 
Deakin et al. (1997) draws out the importance of contracts as a planning and incentivisation 
tool in long-term business relationships. According to TCE logic, the most efficient legal 
safeguard represents a trade-off between different instruments of formal control, depending 
on the degree of asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction frequency (Williamson, 1985). 
Complete contracts reduce uncertainty, risk of opportunism and provide a safeguard against 
ex post performance problems (Williamson, 1985). 
 
Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa (2005) argue that formal control through contracts depends on 
three underlining conditions – codification, monitoring and safeguards - which are seldom 
fulfilled in an inter-organisational relationship. In practice it is rarely possible or practical to 
draft complete contracts owing to the complex nature of product-service offerings, 
asymmetric information situations and associated costs and time efforts (Lyons and Mehta, 
1997). Inter-organisational relationships are mostly governed by incomplete contracts with an 
element of uncertainty that makes them unenforceable in their entirety (Roehrich and Lewis, 
2010). Gaps in the existing contract are filled when contingencies arise, allowing some degree 
of flexibility to deal with unforeseen contingencies (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005).  
2.2.2 Relational capability 
Relational capabilities are an organisation’s ability to benefit from its inter-organisational 
relationships (Bititci et al., 2003). In other words, relationally capable organisations invest in 
relationship-specific assets and effectively create, exchange and exploit knowledge and skills 
through the application of socially complex routines. Thus, relational capabilities refer to 
socially complex routines, procedures and policies in inter-organisational relationships which 
are vital to establish and maintain through inter-personal and inter-organisational trust 
(Zaheer et al., 1998). Partnering companies invest in relationship-specific assets and create 
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exchange knowledge and effectively govern their relationship through relational routines and 
behaviour (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Contractual capabilities are complemented by relational 
capabilities to prevent conflicts and adversarial behaviour and to promote problem-solving 
and information exchange (Carey et al., 2011). 
 
The concept of relational capabilities draws on related concepts such as learning (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002), alliance competence (Gemünden and Ritter, 1997), interaction capability 
(Capaldo, 2007), relational capital and administrative mechanisms providing institutional 
support (Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000). Although relational dynamic capabilities are a significant 
trend in the future of strategic research, their foundations are still in their infancy and their 
investigation is fragmented. A few recent contributions have used empirical approaches and 
moved beyond abstract concepts to focus on practices, functions, tools and controls (Roehrich 
and Lewis, 2010). Prior research on relational capability development explored the concepts 
in alliances and supply chain processes in long-term relationships (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
2.3 Positioning an initial conceptual framework 
Relating the development of contractual and relational capabilities in PSS relationships  to the 
issue of service complexity, we position  an initial conceptual framework as depicted in 
Figure 2. We expect that higher levels of service complexity will need to be supported by a 
higher amount of contractual and relational capabilities in order to coordinate between the 
PSS provider and itscustomers. 
 
 
Figure 2. Initial conceptual framework 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research approach and case selection 
To investigate the research questions: (i) To what extent do different levels of service 
complexity impact on contractual capabilities when providing and buying PSSs?; (ii) To what 
extent do different levels of service complexity impact on relational capabilities when 
providing and buying PSSs?, we present two case studies of different levels of service 
complexity within one company to gather an in-depth understanding of the issue (Stake, 1995; 
Yin, 2009). Our case company, which we label ‘PSS provider’, operates within the European 
healthcare industry and offers support services for their equipment. The company’s service 
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offers can be categorised into three levels which differed mainly in their level of service 
complexity. These three levels are described in Table 1. For this study, we selected an 
agreement from level 1 (case A) and from level 3 (case B) to compare and contrast the impact 
of service complexity on the development of contractual and relational capabilities. 
 
Table 1. Service offerings of PSS provider 
Service 
level 
Complexity Description 
1 Low Proactive preventative maintenance by the supplier to ensure safe and 
efficient operation of the products. This includes documented inspections, 
quality assurance, security inspections and software inspections for viruses 
or similar. 
2 Medium All the activities included in level 1 plus labour rates for corrective 
maintenance activities, telephone support and regular updates of the 
equipment. 
3 High The availability of the product is guaranteed by delivering maintenance 
(both preventative and corrective maintenance activities), delivery of spare 
parts, regular updates of the software systems to enhance productivity and 
availability 
 
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
Our unit of analysis is the PSS, encompassing contractual and relational capability 
developments within two service agreements between the case company and two of their 
customers. The customers were hospitals providing different health services to private 
patients. In 2013, we conducted 23 semi-structured interviews with 19 interviewees both on 
the provider and customer sides to obtain insights from ‘both sides of the story’ (some of the 
interviewees from the PSS provider side were interviewed for both cases). The interviews 
addressed retrospective and current activities of the service agreements. Respondents were 
drawn from multiple functions, such as service managers, account managers, service 
engineers, strategic buyers and physicians who were involved in the servie agreement and 
stood in direct relationship with the customer or PSS provider. We asked questions about the 
rationale for moving to PSS offerings, changes in the organisational strategy and structure, the 
development of the dyadic relationship and the importance and development of contractual 
and relational capabilities. Interviews lasted between 45 and 120 minutes and were tape-
recorded and sub-sequently transcribed. Data collection stopped when we experienced 
conceptual saturation. We triangulated data to overcome common method bias and improve 
internal and external validity and case study rigour (Lewis and Grimes, 1999).This included 
the service contracts, information on the tendering process, marketing material and other 
publicly available information such as announcements on webpages. 
 
We analysed the interview transcripts and the additional material, adopting ‘systematic 
combining’ to inform our analysis of the data (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). In other words, we 
drew on existing theory and aimed to generate justified research questions, analysis and 
implications with regards to causal drivers for PSS and capability developments and changes. 
We systematically coded our data into major thematic categories connected to PSS, relational 
and contracual capabilities (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Some categories were derived from 
our theoretical framing while others emerged based on our empirical data analysis. Data were 
subsequently summarised and written up as case reports to be presented to the case companies 
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for verification. Data were coded, summarised and displayed in an iterative fashion – 
travelling back and forth between data analysis, data collection and pertinent literature – and 
facilitated theory building (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
4. Findings 
Both contracts were based on a long-standing relationship between the PSS provider and two 
customers. However, the interviews highlighted that this relationship changed driven by the 
change of the business context. We describe the context for the PSS relationship before 
highlighting findings with regards to  contractual and relational capabilities. 
4.1 Contextual setting 
The business conditions and contextual setting of the European healthcare sector have 
changed dramatically over recent decades. The process of acquiring new equipment and new 
service agreements has been formalised with the introduction of a formal European-wide 
tendering process. This means that the customer have to publish their requirements with 
detailed descriptions of the required service complexity and requested service activities. This 
process also means that  communication between the customer and the competing PSS 
providers (i.e. bidders) is also formalised. For instance, questions regarding the service 
requirements or contractual arrangements can be asked but tend to be communicated to all 
competing PSS providers. Informal communications or exchange are constraint by these 
tendering regulations. All of the submitted bids are evaluated objectively based on predefined 
and published criteria. These criteria are usually price bid (including the price of the 
equipment, education of the customer’s staff and the Total Cost of Ownership), degree of 
fulfilment of the requirements, performance and workflow. ). The service manager (both 
cases) expressed his evaluation of the changing business context as follows; 
“They have changed a lot. If you look at the sales for instance, in the old days it was the 
relationship between one customer and one sale engineer. That was the most important 
part from the sales. Right now you have the tender business that means that everybody 
from the EU can go in and make an offer when they announce the tenders. We are all 
evaluated objectively. That means the relations are not there at all on the paper. But of 
course in the real world, there are of course some relations that are still working. But 
not as it used to be.” (Service Manager, PSS provider) 
One implication of this formalisation of the tendering and negotiating process is that the 
acquisition process has become longer and more complex. Simple requirements and 
acquisition of equipment cannot be solved within this “relationship between one customer and 
one sale engineer” (Service manager, PSS provider, both cases). In contrast, a formal list of 
requirements has to be compiled for each acquisition which needs to follow rigid European 
legal guidelines and laws. This means that the acquisition process has changed from 
agreements between two companies or even between a sales engineer and his/her customer to 
a more substantial process with legal implications. One of the physicists of case B explaines: 
“It tends to be quite substantive. The work load and so on. You almost need to have a legal 
department nowadays to handle these things” (Physicist 2, customer, case B). 
 
This means that the tenders now mainly  aggregate service offerings into larger contracts. “If 
you win, you win a lot. If you lose, you lose a lot. It is important to win because you can 
actually lose a whole region just in one tender” (Account manager, PSS provider, case B). 
This has put a lot of pressure on the PSS provider to win the tenders when they are 
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announced. In particular, the PSS providers had to adapt to the changes as the tendering 
process had become more strenuous and more complex. These organisational adaptations 
happened abruptly through the introduction of the tendering process and were long lasting 
with effects still visible to date. For the first tender, the PSS provider had to prepare a service 
agreement for 20 products in addition to bids for three other product ranges. The Service 
Manager explained:  
“Four offers at once in a big pile. Nobody had summer vacation that year; everybody 
worked 24 h a day until we could deliver our offers. And you could say ‘That was 
tough.’ But it created that burning platform for us that meant, in fact, that we made 
some things that we are still using today. So that was kind of a shift we made through 
that one (tender).” (Service Manager, PSS provider, both cases) 
In addition, the PSS provider expressed concerns that their customers had become 
increasingly demanding with regards to the service offerings. As such, customers demand 
new business models that do not only include the product but also the maintenance and 
servicing of these products over extended lifecycles. For instance, the Service Manager of the 
PSS provider (both case) mentioned that: “The customer asked for higher uptime of the 
equipment use and then you could not live with the fact that the equipment can be down for 1, 
2 or 3 days. That could happen quite often if you do not do proper maintenance and if you do 
not learn from the past and use this experience to develop solutions that would avoid 
downtime.” As such, the service components have become vital for the survival of European 
manufacturers in the healthcare industry. This means that the PSS providers have changed 
their offerings in accordance with the customer demand to secure additional revenue and 
secure customers. 
4.2 Contractual capabilities 
Our assumption of the initial framework was that service agreements of higher complexity 
will show higher levels of contractual capabilities. One reasons for this assumption was that 
the additional contractual capabilities would be needed to deal with the additional 
uncertainties introduced through the additional activities and their interdependencies of 
services with higher complexity. However, for both cases, only marginal differences in the 
contractual capabilities were detected. Both contracts consisted of three pages with the 
following content: (i) a title page that listed the serviced product(s) with its specifications 
such as product type and model number; (ii) one page describing the service activities. This 
was done using a modular approach where a table showed the different activities for each of 
the three levels of service complexity and the ones included in the specific contract were 
clearly marked.; and (iii) one page of contract specific information such as agreed response 
time, telephone numbers in case telephone support was part of the agreement, the contract 
date and the signatures of contractual partners. 
 
In addition, the contract covering the higher level service complexity offering included two 
additional pages, stating general terms and conditions of the PSS provider. Thus, our 
assumption of higher levels of contractual capabilities for services of higher levels of 
complexity was not empiircally supported across our investigated cases. One reason for this 
could be the high level of regulations within the European healthcare sector. As such, there 
were tight regulations within the sector that had legal implications by themselves as it 
prohibits specific opportunistic behaviour . This was explained by the Account Manager (PSS 
provider) of case B as follows: “We can’t talk together. I can’t call the other company [a 
competitor] and say ‘Well, we don’t like this one going out in the summer. Why don’t we all 
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just ignore it?’ That’s illegal so not possible.” In other words, the legality of possible 
opportunistic behaviours both on the PSS provider and the customer side is mitigated by 
European regulations. This means that rules to mitigate opportunistic behaviour do not have 
to be included in every contract, thus contract complexity has rather been reduced. 
 
The agreement of contract-specific performance indicators was clearly stated from the outset 
of the tendering process. The Service Manager from the PSS provider (both cases) stated: “As 
a result of the tender they [customers] have defined all the service levels. I do not have to tell 
them what those services are because they decided themselves.” However, the customer’s 
specifications in the tender documents may not completely relate to the service offerings by 
the PSS provider. Thus, the Service Manager went on to highlight that: “I then translate their 
service levels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and so on into our service level understanding of [levels 1, 2 and 
3]. That is important as I do not want the transparency to be too big. If they, for instance, 
have a [competitor’s] scanner I can directly compare and if it is not the same I put in more 
modules to match and exceed their [competitor’s] service offering.” This statement highlights 
that despite the high level of regulations in the sector, strategic evaluations and contractual 
arrangements with the specific PSS providers are still important. 
 
An example of contract-specific indicators was the response time to failures of repair requests 
from the customer. This was found to be also related to the level of service complexity across 
the investigated case studies. As such, the contract characterised by a high level of service 
complexity included a shorter response time in the contract than the contract with low service 
complexity. The Service Engineer, PSS provider in case A (low complexity) mentioned that: 
“We [supplier] are on call so they [buyer] can call us within working hours and we need to 
address that within 4 hours. We have to take some actions. That has been the purpose of the 
contract.” In contrast, in case B the PSS provider had to react within one hour of the 
customer request. The Service Engineer, PSS provider, case B explained: “The usual 
procedure will be that if I am just sitting at my office I will go to the customer side, but if I am 
busy with something else, I will connect remotely and see if I can diagnose the problem.” In 
summary, the contract with the higher level of service complexity included performance 
indicators of higher service quality such as response time within the contractual arrangement. 
 
These findings illustrate that even though the contractual capabilities were not a 
distinguishing feature with regards to different levels of service complexity across the 
investigated case studies, they were stillessential to ensure a high level of service quality to be 
delivered throughout the contract period. Contractual capabilities  ensured that occurring 
problems were addressed in a timely manner to avoid any escalation within the PSS provider-
customer relationship.  
4.3 Relational capabilities 
Despite the high level of regulation within the healthcare sector, we found that relational 
capabilities were important across both case studies. The customer in case B expressed this as 
follows: “Personally, I think it’s important that when you go out and you buy a new system, 
you are not allowed to take into consideration your previous experience. But of course 
somewhere, you always have that in the back of your head.” (Physicist 2, customer, case B). 
This highlights that the customer’s experience with PSS providers is an important influence 
on their decision during subsequent tendering processes. This importance was also 
highlighted by the PSS provider: “For the service, relations are very important. (…) And 
these relations are built up over years by brilliant work of all the technicians. So it is very 
important that we have a good foundation from the customer services” (Service Manager, 
Page 10 of 16 
PSS provider, both cases). 
 
Our assumption of the initial framework was that more relational capability is needed for 
services characertised by higher complexity. This assumption was confirmed across both case 
studies. Case A (low service complexity) was characterised by four annual visits for 
preventative maintenance activities where the system was inspected and recommendations 
made. For these visits, appointments are agreed with the customer. “Then we go on site. And 
we have a protocol that we have to fill out. And we go step-by-step and perform all the things 
that need to be done” (Service Engineer, PSS provider, case A). This protocol is sent to the 
customer with a list of faults or recommendations for repairs and/or upgrades. “There is a 
common field that we could fill out. ‘We will recommend you do this and that.’ Or we can say 
‘The system has this fault which we have to find a solution to’ because like here they have to 
pay for the spare parts. So it might be that they want to leave this fault and if it is not security 
or safety, then they can live with that” (Service Engineer, PSS provider, case A). 
 
In contrast, case B (high complexity) was characterised by a much closer relationship between 
the service engineers and the customer. When the engineers are on site for the preventative 
maintenance inspections, they also consider whether there are additional issues they could 
solve during their visit. Service Engineer 2 in case B explained “Before getting started, I will 
ask if they [customer] have any problems that they didn’t report to us. Sometimes they have a 
small problem that they think is not important. They write it in a notebook and they ask me.” 
In addition, the customer recieves much closer attention even if they do not have any issues 
with the product. This was highlighted as follows: “But sometimes I am just going to the 
customer site and have a chat. To see if they have any problems or just to follow up on how it 
goes” (Service Engineer 2, PSS provider, case B). This point was also supported by Service 
Engineer 1 from case B. This engineer had worked with the customer for 36 years and thus 
knew the site very well and had a very close relationship with them. 
“It is always nice to go there. Always when I go there, there are almost all the time 
some questions that I can look at. Maybe it is not my equipment but also something else, 
like a PC is not working or something else. It is like I am working in the hospital.(…) 
Many of them I know personally. Not privately but I have been so many time times they 
know me and I have 5 km to the hospital. So they just call me. They call me directly” 
(Service Engineer 2, PSS provider, case B). 
This high level of relational interaction between PSS provider and customer was confirmed 
by the customer of case B. One of the interviewed physicist explained “I would say that our 
relationship with this technician is informal and it works fine for us. (…) I think it worked 
well if we have a problem we can call (PSS provider) and have a fast and efficient reaction” 
(Physicist 1, customer, case B). The second interviewed physician confirmed this: “The most 
important thing when you call them they react reasonably quick. They’re typically here within 
an hour; so that is the main thing. And when they come here they solve the problem really 
fast” (Physicist 2, customer, case B). This highlights that the customer perceived the 
realtional capabilities in terms of providing high levels of service quality. They did not 
comment on the fact that the service engineers of the PSS provider would sometimes be on 
site without being called in, but they focused mainly on their perception that when they did 
have a problem, it would be solved quickly and effectively. This suggests that high relational 
capability was translated by the customer into perceived service quality. 
 
This seemed to also add to the competitiveness of the PSS provider as the service quality, as 
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perceived by the customer, gave them an advantage over competing PSS providers. The fact 
that local support was available, that the PSS provider had a high level of relational capability 
already built up, gave the PSS provider a competitive to other PSS providers within the 
European community. This was highlighted by one of the physicists:  
“Some of the other manufacturers rely on support from [other European countries] and 
I think that might be a bit too far away in some cases, when you need to get things up 
and running quickly. And also the communication might not flow as easily. But that is a 
good thing with [the PSS provider], they’ve got quite a huge, local department (…). 
That is an advantage” (Physicist 2, customer, case B). 
This development of high levels of relational capabilities was part of the operational strategy 
of the PSS provider. Building a close working relationship between the service engineers and 
the customer was emphasised as an important aspect that was crucial when, for example, 
selling additional services in the future.  
“When we have that [good relations], of course, it is much easier for me to approach 
the customer because they know our good service. And I do not have to present our 
organisation, I do not have to present our concept because they know it. In fact, a lot of 
the service agreements we finalise by mail. I do not visit the customer anymore, we just 
send an email and they come back to me” (Service Manager, PSS provider, both cases). 
Including the relational capability in the operational and sales strategy of the PSS provider 
was particularly important for the contract with a high level of service quality. One of the 
physicists of case B highlighted:  
“It’s nice to know that he’s not on the clock. So when he’s here, we can actually discuss 
things and maybe have a cup of coffee. If that wasn’t the case, we’d have to stand 
beside him and watch ‘is he working now and is he doing this fast?’ It’s more relaxed 
the other way. And then we get the time to discuss other things. (…)  I mean if we want 
to start something new, we can discuss it without worrying about spending [this 
money]” (Physicist 2, Customer, Case B). 
Thus, our case findings suggest that relational capabilities are influenced by service 
complexity: The contract with low level of service complexity (case A) showed lower levels 
of relational capability development than the contract with a high level of service complexity 
(case B). The following section summarises the results of both cases, reflecting on our initial 
framework. 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Contracutal and relational capabilities for PSS relationships 
Table 2 summarises the results of both cases with reference to the initial framework. Our 
initial assumtpions were only partly confirmed through the investigatedcases. Both cases 
illustrated that contractual capabilities did not differ to a high degree between the two levels 
of service complexity. One possible reason for this could be the high level of regulation in the 
industrial sector, as the European healthcare sector is governed by international legal 
agreements. These regulations include possible opportunistic behaviours of PSS providers and 
customers. Contractual capabilities are often used to control for these possible opportunistic 
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behaviours, and thus having a high level of regulations means that contractual capabilites can 
be kept at a low level. Extant literature suggests that the development of contractual capability 
is particularly important for service agreements as possible opportunistic behaviour can be 
mitigated, long-term relationships can be established, operational outcomes at agreed 
performance levels can be guaranteed and competitive advantage can be achieved. However, 
we showed that in highly regulated business contexts such as the European healthcare 
industry, high levels of contractual capabilities are not necessary as the regulations deal with 
these types of uncertainties and possible sources of opportunistic behaviour. 
 
Table 2. Summary of findings of contractual and relational capabilities for contracts of 
different service complexities 
 Low level of service complexity High level of service complexity 
Description Proactive preventative maintenance by the 
supplier to ensure safe and efficient 
operation of the products. This includes 
documented inspections, quality assurance, 
security inspections and software inspections 
for viruses or similar. 
The availability of the product is guaranteed by 
delivering maintenance (both preventative and 
corrective maintenance activities), delivery of 
spare parts, regular updates of the software 
systems to enhance productivity and 
availability. 
Contractual 
capability 
Contractual arrangment on three pages 
including: 
 Title page with equipment 
specifications, 
 Service activities included in the 
agreement, 
 Contract specific information including 
date and signatures. 
Contractual arrangment on five pages including: 
 Title page with equipment specifications, 
 Service activities included in the agreement, 
 Contract specific information including date 
and signatures. 
 Two pages of terms and conditions form 
Servie provider. 
Relational 
capability  
Importance of relational capability in the 
service agreement, 
Low levels of relational capability as every 
activity and visit needs to be recorded and 
charged to customer, 
Formalised information exchange through 
service protocols 
Importance of relational capability in the service 
agreement, 
High level of relational capability with regular 
visits outside of scheduled or requested 
inspections and repairs, 
Informal information exchange between PSS 
provider and customer, 
Long standing relationship between service 
engineer and customer, 
High level of relational capability used for sales 
strategy 
 
In contrast, relational capabilities were found to be an important mechanism and 
distinguishing feature even in the existence of high level of regulations. We found that it 
could influence perceived service quality and future sales. We further found that relational 
capabilities were dependent on the level of service complexity. For the contract with a high 
level of service complexity, we detected a high level of relational capability development that 
was characterised by a close relationship between the service engineer and the customer. In 
addition, this relationship was characterised by frequent unscheduled visits by the service 
engineer to the customer site to see whether any additional help could be provided. In 
contrast, the contract with a low level of service complexity was characterised by a close 
relationship between service engineers and the customer only for the activities explicitly 
included in the contract. No additional visits were undertaken and any activities beyond the 
service agreement were communicated to the customer as recommendations. 
 
Prior studies further suggested that relational capabilities are a governance mechanism to 
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create relational routines (Dyer and Singh, 1998), prevent conflicts and solve problems as 
well as exchange information (Carey et al., 2011). These insights were confirmed through our 
case studies as services with high relational capability were characterised by strong relational 
routines and a high level of information exchange between PSS provider and customer. In 
addition, we showed that a high evel of relational capability can also be a tool to create 
competitive advantage as it creates a high level of perceived service quality for the customer 
through short response times and effective problem solving (Grönroos, 1984; Parasuraman et 
al., 1988). This was further found to influence the possibility of future sales both of the 
product and of future service agreements in the context of competitive bidding (Kreye et al., 
forthcoming). 
 
We showed that the development of relational capabilities was particularly influenced by the 
level of service complexity as higher complexity leads to higher relational capabilities. 
However, due to the high level of industrial regulation within the investigated research 
context of the European healthcare sector, we did not confirm our assumption of higher 
contractual capabilities for levels of high service complexity. We acknowledge that this is a 
limitation of the presented research and suggest that future research needs to address this issue 
in less regulated business contexts.  
5.2 Positioning a revised conceptual framework 
Based on these findings, we position a revised conceptual framework, depicted in Figure 3. 
The existence of sector-wide regulations meant that the development of contractual 
capabilities was not dependent on the level of service complexity, while relational capability 
increased with the level of service complexity. The investigated cases particularly illustrated 
that the development of relational capabilities influenced the customer’s perceived level of 
service quality, the customer’s attitude towards purchasing new equipment and further 
services from the provider and the PSS provider’s competitive advantage when bidding for 
new service agreements. 
 
 
Figure 3. Revised conceptual framework 
Our study paves the way for future research which should  investigate whether contractual 
capabilities are of similar importance as relational capabilities in less reguated business 
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environments. As our findings focuses on a highly regulated business sector, we did not find 
any impact of service complexity on contractual capabilities. Further research should refine 
our revised conceptual framework by offering further  insights into the processes and 
organisational changes that manufacturers need to address to become successful providers of 
PSS and add value to their core offerings. In addition, further research also needs to establish 
whether a company’s level of relational (and contractual) capabilities can be used as a tool to 
judge its readiness to move to the next step along the service ladder in servitization. In other 
words, a company’s capabilities can be used as a basis for the managerial and strategic 
decision-making process to deliver service offerings of higher levels of complexity. 
6. Conclusions and l implications 
This paper described the relationaship between service complexity and the development of 
contractual and relational capabilities within the buyer-supplier relationship for product-
service system provision . We presented two industrial cases of one PSS provider and two of 
their customers, which differed in the level of service complexity. Our empirical study offers 
two distinct, but inter-related, contributions: (i) service complexity did not impact on 
contractual capabilities due to the high level regulation within the studied industrial sector; 
and (ii) increasing levels of service complexity increase the level relational capability 
development of PSS provider and customer. Developing and mainting relational capabilities 
can be considered a vital distinguishing feature for PSS relationships. Thus, we contribute to 
extant literature  by extending previous findings to the concept of service complexity and 
investigating the dyadic PSS relationship. This is important as manufacturing companies tend 
to increase the level of service complexity of their offerings when shifting to being a provider 
of PSSs. Our findings suggest that when realising a servitization shift, manufacturing 
companies need to improve particularly their relational capabilities such as establishing 
relational routines and behaviour, exchanging knowledge and information and building up 
inter-personal and inter-organisational trust. While  developing contractual capabilities is 
important, it is the development of relational capabilities that can function as a distinguishing 
feature in PSS relationships. 
 
The research results have multiple implications for management practice. First, manufacturers 
in highly regulated industry sectors should focus mainly on the development of relational 
rather than contractual capabilities as a distinguishing feature. The reason for this is that 
contractual capabilities are typically covered by the sector regulations as legal punishment for 
opportunistic behaviour is established across company and national borders. Second, EU 
regulations to standardise operations and processes within the industrial sector may be a 
useful tool to icrease the global competitiveness of Europe’s manufacturers. A high level of 
industrial regulations means that manufacturers can focus their efforts on developing 
relational capabilities that improve perceived service quality by the customer and improve the 
strategic position of manufacturers in the tendering process for new service contracts. Third, 
these relational capabilities can be developed step-by-step by the manufacturers as they 
engage in servitization and undergo the service ladder and increase the servoce complexity of 
their offering. This means that the relational capability may be auseful tool to judge a 
company’s “readiness” to engage in the next step of servitization. 
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